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WAGES’ IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
A GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
Abstract: To evaluate the spatialities of the illegal wage practice where employers pay their 
declared employees both an official declared wage and an undeclared ‘envelope’ wage so as to 
avoid tax liabilities, a 2007 survey conducted in 27 European Union (EU) member states is 
reported. The finding is that 5% of employees received envelope wages which amount on average 
to some two-fifths of their wage packet. Revealing how, although heavily concentrated in a small 
group of East-Central European nations, this wage practice is nonetheless ubiquitous, the paper 
concludes by discussing how this practice might be tackled.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the start of the new millennium, a small but growing tributary of thought 
has begun to unravel the existence of an illegal wage practice in which employ-
ers pay their declared employees two wages, an official wage which is declared 
to the state for tax and social security purposes and an unofficial ‘envelope’ 
wage that is not declared (Karpuskiene, 2007; Neef, 2002; Sedlenieks, 2003; 
Williams, 2007; Woolfson, 2007; Žabko and Rajevska, 2007). In this paper, the 
aim is to provide for the first time a cross-national evaluation of the prevalence 
and nature of this wage arrangement in the European Union (EU).  
To do this, firstly, the previous research on envelope wages in Europe will be 
reviewed. Revealing that past studies have been small-scale, resulting in a lack 
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of knowledge on the prevalence of envelope wages in Europe, the second section 
then introduces a cross-national survey of envelope wages conducted in 2007 
involving 26,659 face-to-face interviews in the 27 European Union (EU) 
member states. The third section will then report the findings. Revealing that  
a significant minority of declared employees in the EU receive envelope wages 
and that it is ubiquitous even if it is heavily concentrated in particular regions of 
the EU, the final section will then call for greater attention to be paid to both 
evaluating the impacts of this wage practice and how it might be tackled. 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON ENVELOPE WAGES IN EUROPE  
There are a number of ways in which wages might not be declared. On the one 
hand, there are wholly undeclared wages, or what is variously referred to as the 
‘cash-in-hand’, ‘hidden’, ‘informal’, ‘off-the-books’, ‘shadow’ or ‘underground’ 
economy or sector (see Williams, 2006). Here, the work contract between the 
employer and employee is in its entirety hidden from, or unregistered by, the 
state for tax, social security or labour law purposes. There is no formal contract 
between the employer and employee and none of the income from the work is 
declared to the state for tax, social security or labour law purposes. Indeed,  
a vast body of literature exists on this type of undeclared work in which a worker 
is paid entirely cash-in-hand both in Europe (e.g., Arrowsmith et al., 2003; 
European Industrial Relations Observatory, 2005; Neef, 2002; Pavlovskaya, 
2004; Ram et al., 2002a, b, 2003; Round and Williams, 2008; Smith and 
Stenning, 2006; Wallace and Haerpfer, 2002; Wallace and Latcheva, 2006; 
Williams, 2006, 2007; Williams and Round, 2007, 2008) and beyond (e.g., 
Bajada and Schneider, 2005; Fernandez-Kelly and Shefner, 2006; Kirchler, 
2007; Schneider, 2008). 
On the other hand, however, and less discussed, are those undeclared wages 
paid by employers to their declared employees as ‘envelope’ wages which are 
paid in addition to the official declared salary. These undeclared ‘envelope’ 
wages paid by employers to declared employees have been perhaps ignored, 
overlooked or simply forgotten because a belief has persisted that formal and 
informal jobs are separate and discrete. The idea that declared employees 
working for legitimate employers could be receiving undeclared wages, and that 
a job might be neither purely formal nor informal, is not considered.  
A small but growing stream of literature, however, has started to highlight the 
wage practice where declared employees receive from their employer two 
wages, an official wage declared to the state for tax and social security purposes 
and an unofficial ‘envelope’ wage which is not declared (Karpuskiene, 2007; 
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Neef, 2002; Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams and Round, 2007; Woolfson, 2007; 
Žabko and Rajevska, 2007). So far, nevertheless, most have been small-scale, 
often qualitative, studies conducted almost entirely in East-Central European 
nations, namely Latvia (OECD, 2003; Sedlenieks, 2003; Žabko and Rajevska, 
2007), Lithuania (Karpuskiene, 2007; Woolfson, 2007), Romania (Neef, 2002) 
and Russia (Williams and Round, 2007).  
The study in Lithuania by Woolfson (2007), for instance, is an in-depth case 
study of one person, albeit a cause celebre, whilst the Latvian study by Sedle-
nieks (2003) reports 15 face-to-face interviews conducted in Riga. Although the 
evidence from Ukraine is based on interviews with 600 households, these were 
conducted in four starkly contrasting localities (Williams, 2007; Williams and 
Round, 2008), whilst the evidence from Russia is based on interviews with 313 
households in three districts of Moscow (Williams and Round, 2007). Until now, 
therefore, there have been no extensive surveys of the prevalence of envelope 
wages. The result is that little is known about the pervasiveness of envelope 
wages in Europe, especially beyond East-Central Europe.  
The findings of the studies so far conducted, nevertheless, provide a strong 
justification for more extensive research on this wage practice. In Ukraine, for 
example, one-third (31%) of all employees interviewed were paid envelope 
wages and the total received amounted to between 20% and 80% of their gross 
wage (Williams, 2007). Comparing labour force and employer surveys in Latvia, 
meanwhile, the OECD (2003) find that 20% of private sector employees earn 
envelope wages whilst in Moscow some 65% of the labour force asserted that 
they receive envelope wages (Williams and Round, 2007).  
The reason it is perhaps so popular with employers is because it allows them 
to avoid social insurance and tax liabilities. By paying the minimum wage to the 
employee as their official wage and then supplementing this with envelope 
wages, it also allows employers to differentiate between employees so as to 
encourage those no longer wanted to voluntarily leave in order to avoid redun-
dancy pay (Hazans, 2005; Round et al, 2008). It might be assumed that employ-
ees would also welcome such envelope wages since they receive higher wages 
than would otherwise be the case if employers had to pay their full social 
insurance and tax liabilities. In practice, however, this does not occur (Round et 
al., 2008; Williams, 2007; Williams and Round, 2007). Employers fail to pass 
on the savings to employees and impose envelope wages onto employees. The 
outcome is that employees find themselves unable to gain full access to the 
mortgages and credit to which they would otherwise be entitled, and have lower 
pension and social security entitlements in systems where the pension and social 
security levels are tied to one’s previous official wage. Governments, similarly, 
dislike envelope wage payments because they reduce tax revenue that could be 
used to fund broader societal projects (Williams, 2007). 
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Unknown so far, however, is whether this wage arrangement is ubiquitous 
across Europe, or whether it is confined to particular pockets of the European 
labour market. Below, in consequence, the first extensive cross-national survey 
of the extent and character of envelope wages in 27 EU member states is 
reported.  
3. EXAMINING ENVELOPE WAGES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In late 2005 the European Commission funded a team (which included this 
paper’s author) to design a direct survey to evaluate the extent and nature of both 
undeclared work in general and envelope wages more particularly in the 
European Union (TNS Infratest et al., 2006). The fieldwork for the eventual 
survey, namely Special Eurobarometer No. 284 (‘Undeclared work in the 
European Union’), conducted as part of wave 67.3 of Eurobarometer, was 
undertaken during May and June 2007.  
In this paper, the findings with regard to envelope wage payments are re-
ported, the subject matter of one section of the questionnaire. Mirroring the 
sampling method of other Eurobarometer surveys, 26,659 face-to-face inter-
views were conducted in the 27 EU member states, ranging from some 500 
interviews in smaller member states to 1,500+ interviews in larger EU countries. 
In each nation, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling method was 
employed. A number of sampling points were drawn with probability propor-
tional to population size (for total coverage of the country) and to population 
density according to the Eurostats NUTS II (or equivalent) and the distribution 
of the resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In 
each of these selected sampling units, a starting address was then randomly 
drawn. Further addresses (every nth address) were then selected using 
standard ‘random route’ procedures from the initial address. In each house-
hold, meanwhile, the respondent was chosen at random (following the 
‘closest birthday rule’).  
All interviews were undertaken face-to-face in people’s homes and in the 
appropriate national language with adults aged 15 years and over. The data 
collected was collated using CAPI (computer assisted personal interview) in 
countries where this was available. For all countries, a national weighting 
procedure was used for analytical purposes employing marginal and intercellular 
weighting by comparing the sample with the universe description taken from 
Eurostat population data and national statistical offices. In each nation, this 
weighting procedure ensured that the gender, age, region and size of locality of 
the sample were proportionate to the universe. 
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The survey results, nevertheless, remain estimates and should be treated with 
caution. Their accuracy, everything being equal, rests upon the sample size and 
upon the observed percentage. With samples of about 1,000 interviews, the real 
percentages will differ within the confidence limits detailed in table 1. This needs 
to be considered when reading the results below. Direct surveys, moreover, have 
tended to produce lower levels of participation in informal employment than more 
indirect survey methods using proxy indicators (Bajada and Schneider, 2005) and 
as such, the estimates of this survey should perhaps be treated as lower-bound 
estimates of the extent of envelope wage payments in the EU.  
 
Table 1. Confidence limits of the observed percentages in the survey 
 
Observed percentages (%) Confidence limits (points) 
10 or 90 + or – 1.9  
20 or 80 + or – 2.5 
30 or 70 + or – 2.7 
40 or 60 + or – 3.0  
50 + or – 3.1  
 
The face-to-face interview schedule covered a wide array of questions on the 
extent and nature of undeclared work starting with attitudinal questions, then 
questions on whether they had received undeclared goods and services followed 
by questions on whether they had received envelope wages and finally, whether 
they had supplied undeclared work. Given the focus in this paper on envelope 
wages, discussion here is confined to the questions asked in relation to this issue. 
Firstly, that is, respondents were asked, ‘Sometimes employers prefer to pay all or 
part of the regular salary or the remuneration for extra work or overtime hours 
cash-in-hand and without declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Did your 
employer pay you all or part of your income in the last 12 months in this way?’. 
Secondly, and to understand whether envelope wages were paid for regular work, 
overtime or both, interviewees were asked ‘Was this income part of the remunera-
tion for your regular work, was it payments for overtime, or both?’ and thirdly, 
they were asked what percentage of their gross yearly income from their main job 
is received as an envelope wage. Below, the results are reported. 
4. EXTENT AND NATURE OF ENVELOPE WAGES IN THE EU 
Of the 26,659 face-to-face interviews conducted, some 11,885 were with formal 
employees in employment. Some 1 in 20 (5%) of these employees (616 employ-
ees in total) had received all or part of their salary as undeclared wages within 
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the past 12 months. If extrapolated to the EU as a whole, this suggests that in 
absolute terms, some 11 million of the 210 million employees in the EU receive 
envelope wages. On average, those in receipt of envelope wages received two-
fifths of their total wage in this manner. Is this wage practice evenly spread 
across the EU or concentrated in particular countries and regions? Does the 
character of envelope wage payments differ across the EU both in terms of 
whether it is paid for regular or extra work, who receives such wages and the 
businesses paying such wages?  
4.1. Envelope Wages: A Geographical Analysis 
Across the EU as a whole, 616 respondents reported that they received envelope 
wages, 29% for their regular work, 27% for extra work or overtime and 36% for 
both their regular and overtime work. In order to further investigate the geogra-
phies of envelope wages, and given the small numbers of respondents involved, 
the results from the 27 EU member states are here grouped in the first instance 
into four broad geographical regions: 
− Continental Europe, UK and Ireland (Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and the UK);  
− East-Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia);  
− Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal), and  
− Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden).  
 
Table 2. Prevalence and types of envelope wages: by EU geographical region 
 
Envelope wage paid as remuneration for: 
Country 
No. waged 
employees 
surveyed 
% who 
receive 
envelope 
wage 
regular 
work 
overtime/extra 
work 
both 
regular and 
overtime 
work 
refusal + 
do not 
know 
Continental Europe 4,404 2 18 65 14 3 
East-Central 
Europe 4,511 11 39 21 37 3 
Southern Europe 1,933 4 18 43 26 13 
Nordic countries 1,534 3 7 70 9 14 
All EU, weighted 
average 11,885 5 29 27 36 8 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey No. 278, 2007. 
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When analysed through the lens of these four regions, table 2 reveals some 
clear patterns so far as the geographies of envelope wages are concerned. 
Envelope wages are more common in East-Central Europe with 11% of employ-
ees in this EU region receiving envelope wages compared with just 2% in 
Continental European nations, 4% in southern Europe and 3% in Nordic 
countries. There are also marked variations in the character of envelope wages in 
these four regions. Some two-thirds of envelope wages in both Continental 
Europe and Nordic countries (65% and 70% respectively) are received for 
overtime payments or extra work conducted. In East-Central Europe and 
southern Europe, however, envelope wages are paid more usually for regular 
work or for both regular work and overtime. 
The outcome, as table 3 displays, is that although only just over a third (36%) 
of the employees surveyed are in East-Central Europe, well over two-thirds 
(68%) of those reporting that they received envelope wages worked in these 
countries and 84% of all employees receiving an envelope wage for their regular 
employment. As such, envelope wages are heavily concentrated in East-Central 
Europe.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of envelope waged work across EU regions: by type of envelope waged work 
 
% of all receiving an envelope wage for: 
Country 
% of waged  
employees 
surveyed 
% of all  
receiving an  
envelope wage 
regular  
work 
overtime/extra 
work 
both regular  
and overtime 
work 
Continental 
Europe   36   14     8   27     6 
East-Central 
Europe   36   68   84   43   81 
Southern Europe   16   12     7   16   11 
Nordic countries   12     6     1   14     2 
All EU-27 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey, 2007. 
 
However, and as table 4 reveals, when individual nations are analysed, there 
are marked cross-national variations in both the extent to which envelope wages 
are used and their nature. In Continental Europe, for example, the prevalence of 
envelope wages ranges from 6% of employees in Belgium to 1% in the United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg, France and Germany. Similarly, in southern Europe, its 
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prevalence ranges from 7% of employees in Italy to 1% in Malta. It is in East-
Central Europe, however, that the variations are perhaps most polarised. 
Table 4. % of employees paid envelope wages in the past 12 months,  
by EU member state 
 
Envelope wages paid for: 
Country 
No. of  
waged  
employees  
surveyed 
% all  
employees  
receiving  
envelope  
wages 
% of gross  
income  
received as  
envelope 
wages 
regular 
work 
overtime/ 
extra 
work 
both 
regular  
and 
overtime 
work 
refusal + 
do not 
know 
EU27 11,885 5 43 29 27 36 8 
East-Central 
Europe 4,511 12 50 40 16 41 3 
Romania 453 23 70 48 9 41 2 
Latvia 511 17 46 47 18 34 1 
Bulgaria 446 14 44 46 15 37 2 
Lithuania 446 11 48 44 10 46 0 
Poland 337 11 53 35 15 50 0 
Estonia 457 8 31 37 20 32 11 
Hungary 392 8 24 19 50 27 4 
Slovakia 537 7 25 39 43 18 0 
Slovenia 431 5 23 13 40 28 19 
Czech 
Republic 501 3 14 13 46 41 0 
Southern 
Europe 1,933 6 37 15 25 38 22 
Italy 401 7 63 12 17 44 27 
Spain 423 5 19 18 36 32 14 
Portugal 421 4 42 19 15 33 33 
Cyprus 210 4 11 9 54 37 0 
Greece 292 3 31 29 54 17 0 
Malta 186 1 20 100 0 0 0 
Continental 
Europe 3,907 2 24 20 61 16 3 
Belgium 428 6 14 18 66 10 6 
Austria 519 4 19 14 48 30 8 
Ireland 458 2 26 11 66 0 23 
Netherlands 515 2 18 0 75 15 10 
Germany 657 1 23 35 65 0 0 
France 507 1 54 11 61 28 0 
Luxembourg 223 1 11 0 100 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 600 1 1 27 53 20 0 
Nordic 
nations  1,534 3 7 7 69 13 11 
Finland 491 3 8 6 80 9 5 
Sweden 546 3 7 6 80 9 5 
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Denmark 497 2 6 8 44 16 32 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey No. 284, 2007. 
There is a clear segmentation of the East-Central European nations with re-
gard to envelope wages. On the one hand are those countries in which envelope 
wages are extensively used, paid to employees more for their regular hours and 
amount to on average around half of formal employees’ wages (i.e., Romania, 
Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland). On the other hand, however, are those 
countries in which envelope wages are less common, paid more for overtime or 
extra work and amount on average to around a quarter of employees’ wage 
packets (i.e., Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia).  
The outcome is that 54% of all employees receiving envelope wages are 
concentrated in just five East-Central European countries – Romania, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland – that contain less than 16% of the EU adult 
population. Indeed, three-quarters of employees receiving envelope wages for 
regular work are in these five countries.  
Which businesses, therefore, pay envelope wages? Which population groups 
receive envelope wages? And does this vary geographically across the EU?  
4.2. Which Businesses Pay Envelope Wages? 
Table 5 begins to unpack the type of business that pays envelope wages. This 
reveals that although this wage arrangement is ubiquitous across all business 
types, envelope wages are used more by smaller- than larger-sized businesses. In 
East-Central Europe, for instance, 19% of employees in businesses with 1–20 
employees received envelope wages and this steadily declines as firm size 
increases, with just 3% of employees in businesses with over 500 employees 
receiving envelope wages. This is replicated across all other EU regions.  
 
Table 5. Prevalence of envelope in EU regions: by business type and population group  
 
% of all employees receiving envelope 
wages 
Nordic 
nations 
Continental 
Europe 
East-Central 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
1 2 3 4 5 
No. of employees in business     
 1–20 9 4 19 8 
 21–50 5 2 13 3 
 51–100 0 1 11 9 
 101–500 3 1 12 3 
 501+ 0 1 3 4 
Sector     
 Construction 9 4 22 8 
 Industry 1 1 10 12 
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 Household services 0 1 3 11 
 Transport 3 1 18 4 
 Personal services 2 1 17 3 
     
Table 5 (cont.) 
     
1 2 3 4 5 
 Retail   6 4 13 3 
 Repair services   0 2 18 0 
 Hotel, restaurant, cafes 17 7 11 2 
 Agriculture   0 0 19 0 
General Occupation     
 Managers   2 1 12 4 
 Other white collar workers   2 2   8 6 
 Manual workers   4 2 15 6 
Gender     
 Man   4 2 15 7 
 Woman   2 1   9 4 
Age     
 15–24   9 4 16 9 
 25–39   3 2 13 6 
 40–54   2 1 11 5 
 55+   1 1   9 3 
Gross formal job income/month (€)     
<500   0 3 14 1 
500–1000   5 3 10 5 
1001–2000   4 3 21 8 
2001–3000   3 1   0 0 
3001+   2 1   0 6 
 
Source: Eurobarometer survey No. 284, 2007. 
 
Examining the incidence of envelope wages across different sectors, mean-
while, the finding is that there are variations across the EU in the sectors in 
which envelope wages are most common. In East-Central Europe, the sectors in 
which envelope wages have penetrated most deeply are construction, agriculture, 
transport and repair services, in southern Europe it is manufacturing industry and 
household services, but in both Continental European and Nordic nations it is the 
hotel, restaurant and café sector along with construction and retail sectors in 
which envelope wages are most prevalent.  
4.3. Who Receives Envelope Wage Payments? 
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It is not just that some types of business more commonly pay envelope wages. 
As table 5 reveals, some population groups are also more likely than others to 
receive envelope wages. On the whole, the patterns are remarkably similar 
across all regions of the EU. In all regions, this wage arrangement is more 
prevalent amongst manual workers than among white collar workers. Men are 
also more likely than women to be paid envelope wages and across the EU as  
a whole, 6% of men in employment but just 4% of women employees receive 
envelope wages. The outcome is that some two-thirds (67%) of those receiving 
envelope wages are men. Envelope wages are also more common amongst 
younger employees across all EU regions. In Nordic nations, for instance, some 
9% of those aged under 25 receive envelope wages, while this steadily declines 
with age and is only 1% among those aged 55 or more.  
There is also a relationship between formal gross wages and envelope wages. 
However, this varies across the EU. Envelope wages are more common amongst 
those with lower formal incomes in East-Central Europe, where such wages are 
paid more for regular work, but more prevalent amongst those with higher wages 
elsewhere in the EU where envelope wages are used more to reimburse overtime 
work. In sum, although envelope wages are concentrated in some population 
groups more than others, this wage practice is ubiquitous. Few, if any, social 
groups are exempt from this practice. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
It might be assumed that doing nothing is the most appropriate approach towards 
envelope wages. After all, if envelope wage practices are clamped down on, 
where at least the employees are officially registered and a portion of their 
earnings declared, employers might turn to wholly off-the-books employment 
contracts. The problem with this laissez-faire approach, however, is that allows  
a continuation of the situation where employees cannot gain full access to not 
only social security and pension payments since their official wages are lower 
than their actual wage but also mortgages and credit due to their low official 
wage. Allowing envelope wages to continue also perpetuates a climate of unfair 
competition for legitimate businesses (both on an intra- and inter-national level) 
and encourages a race to the bottom in terms of employment conditions and 
standards. The outcome for governments is that the attainment of broader 
societal goals such as social inclusion is hindered by depriving the state of the 
revenue required to finance social protection. For these rationales, a laissez-faire 
approach is here rejected and intervention advocated. Intervention in this realm, 
however, can take diverse forms. 
Colin C. Williams 
 
126 
One policy intervention is to simply increase the level of fines for those 
caught paying envelope wages and to increase the probability of detection. The 
problem is that evaluations of increasing penalties and detection methods are not 
conclusive (for a review, see Kirchler, 2007; Williams, 2006). Another option, 
therefore, is to provide incentives to prevent employers turning towards enve-
lope wages in the first place. These include: simplifying regulatory compliance 
such as the procedures to both register and pay declared employees; shifting 
from direct to indirect taxation systems, and raising the level of the minimum 
wage. The latter in particular needs serious consideration. In East-Central 
Europe where envelope wages are concentrated, minimum wage levels have 
been set cautiously at around half the average wage level (European Commis-
sion, 2007). The rationale was to prevent a shift from formal to informal 
employment. The problem, however, is that low minimum wages might have 
deterred a shift into informal employment, but has provided scope for paying  
a large portion of employees’ earnings as an envelope wage. Raising the 
minimum wage closer to the average wage would therefore reduce the portion of 
the total wage that could be paid as an envelope wage. The issue of course is that 
employers might then decide to employ workers on a wholly undeclared basis. 
This policy measure of increasing the minimum wage level will therefore need 
to be piloted and critically evaluated, especially with regard to determining 
whether there is a tipping point at which employers shift from formalising to 
informalising work.  
Another option, especially to tackle employers already paying envelope 
wages, is to offer an amnesty to those wishing to fully declare the wages they 
pay. Another is to shift from the use of direct to indirect taxes, a proposal 
currently advocated by the European Commission for tackling undeclared work 
more widely (European Commission, 2007), in order to reduce employer 
contributions and therefore the need for employers to seek savings by using 
envelope wage arrangements. Finally, there is also the option of providing tax 
education and to raise awareness about the benefits of formal employment so as 
to win ‘hearts and minds’. An example here is the campaign pursued in Latvia 
about the benefits of declared work and disadvantages of envelope wages 
entitled ‘work contracts work’. Although this has not been so far evaluated, 
evidence from UK advertising campaigns that extol the benefits of declared 
work display a return-cost ratio of 19:1 in terms of revenue returns for tax 
authorities (i.e., £19 return for every £1 spent) while punitive measures have  
a return-cost ratio of just 5:1 (National Audit Office, 2008). In consequence, 
such indirect controls could be an effective policy approach for tackling enve-
lope wages.  
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None of these policy initiatives, it should be noted, are mutually exclusive. 
Governments could increase the minimum wage and at the same time offer 
amnesties to employers deciding to bring envelope wage payments into the 
declared realm and then, for those failing to do so, implement higher fines for 
those subsequently caught using improved detection methods whilst at the same 
time introducing tax education campaigns.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
To evaluate the prevalence and distribution of envelope wages in the EU, this 
paper has reported the results of a 2007 Eurobarometer survey conducted in  
27 EU member states and involving 26,659 face-to-face interviews. The finding 
is that 1 in 20 employees in the EU had received such envelope wage payments 
in the previous year from their formal employer and that these undeclared 
payments on average amounted to some two-fifths of their gross wage. Such  
a wage practice, moreover, is ubiquitous in all countries, sectors, firm sizes and 
socio-economic groups throughout the EU, even if it is relatively more common 
in some rather than others.  
Analysing the countries in which envelope wages are more prevalent, it has 
revealed that envelope wages are much more common in East-Central Europe, 
where such payments are more likely to be for regular employment hours, 
whilst in Continental Europe and Nordic countries envelope wages are less 
common and received more for overtime or extra work conducted. Indeed, 
some 54% of all envelope wages, and three-quarters of envelope wages paid 
for regular work hours, are concentrated in just five countries, namely Bul-
garia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Despite this spatial concentra-
tion, it should not be ignored that this is nonetheless a ubiquitous practice, 
albeit one more concentrated in some countries, business types and populations 
than others.  
Indeed, these findings have important implications. On the one hand, they 
reveal that this wage practice needs to be brought out of the margins and 
positioned more centre-stage in research on work practices in Europe and 
beyond and also that further investigations are now required, such as on the 
nature of its impacts on workers receiving such wages, legitimate businesses 
who must compete with those paying illegitimate envelope wage and govern-
ments suffering loss of tax revenue. On the other hand, however, these findings 
also reveal the need for more in-depth discussion of how this wage practice 
might be tackled. Hopefully, therefore, this paper will encourage others to not 
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only further interrogate this so far largely neglected illegal wage practice in 
Europe but also to further explore how to tackle this arrangement. If it does so, 
then it will have achieved its intention.  
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